Transparency · updated monthly
Warrant canary.
A signed, time-bound statement designed to make silence visible. The plaintext below is the canonical source.
Current statement
Current and signed
A PGP signature is attached and the statement is inside its validity window.
889D A7D2 DCFB 4F60 6B41 7D06 80E3 18D8 60BD 9FCD
cd5106acb1f216bfe4e37ddc08423a78f0519a44701051f5bd1ee93d2eb1d9f2
PGP signature
Attached
Public key
Published
Published
Sep 12, 2026
Renew by
Oct 17, 2026
What the operator attests
These claims are trustworthy only after independent signature verification.
leak.fun has not received a National Security Letter, secret court order, or other classified demand for user information.
leak.fun has not received an order requiring the operator to weaken, backdoor, or otherwise compromise the service.
leak.fun is not subject to a gag order that prevents disclosure of a request for user information.
leak.fun has not knowingly provided bulk access to user data or cryptographic key material to a government or law-enforcement agency.
No leak.fun canary signing key has been seized or compromised to the operator's knowledge.
Canonical statement
This is the exact content served at /canary.txt.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 leak.fun Warrant Canary Version: 1 Status: ACTIVE Statement-ID: 2026-09 Published-At: 2026-09-12T17:40:00.600Z Valid-Until: 2026-10-17T17:40:00.600Z PGP-Fingerprint: 889D A7D2 DCFB 4F60 6B41 7D06 80E3 18D8 60BD 9FCD Public-Key-URL: https://leak.fun/canary-key.asc Previous-Statement-SHA256: ea384419510066e7edec8d8012c1b8ba05fdb2d1a10181a1b3e91a10c30ceea2 Freshness-Proof: Bitcoin latest block hash: 00000000000000000001cd8fd39ad2b6be5976bf4b45965f6590c7619a008d34; Ethereum latest block hash: 0xa94976da5a227fddc26d2d90bc14299501c848de4118831a2c4f0a09462c81e4 Bitcoin-Block-Hash: 00000000000000000001cd8fd39ad2b6be5976bf4b45965f6590c7619a008d34 Ethereum-Block-Hash: 0xa94976da5a227fddc26d2d90bc14299501c848de4118831a2c4f0a09462c81e4 The leak.fun operator affirms the following statements as of the Published-At timestamp above. Statements: 1. leak.fun has not received a National Security Letter, secret court order, or other classified demand for user information. 2. leak.fun has not received an order requiring the operator to weaken, backdoor, or otherwise compromise the service. 3. leak.fun is not subject to a gag order that prevents disclosure of a request for user information. 4. leak.fun has not knowingly provided bulk access to user data or cryptographic key material to a government or law-enforcement agency. 5. No leak.fun canary signing key has been seized or compromised to the operator's knowledge. Continuity: The Previous-Statement-SHA256 field links each signed statement to the complete bytes of the statement that preceded it. A missing, late, invalid, or broken-chain statement should be investigated, but is not by itself proof that any event described above has occurred. Scope: These statements are made only to the operator's knowledge as of the Published-At timestamp. They are a transparency signal, not legal advice or an absolute guarantee. End-of-statement: leak.fun warrant canary version 1 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iJEEARYKADkWIQSInafS3PtPYGtBfQaA4xjYYL2fzQUCaqWOfBsUgAAAAAAEAA5t YW51MiwyLjUrMS4xMiwyLDEACgkQgOMY2GC9n80ofAEAygYN9TxfbDlz4JHpZlYX pMNAgHy9TalvwxoN1odtFsMBAKHqMHLsJAh3LpxXbgFcIWyUzegq7h28hE+N52va qAAH =rPeL -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Freshness proof
Recent Bitcoin and Ethereum block hashes make silent backdating harder.
- Bitcoin block hash
- 00000000000000000001cd8fd39ad2b6be5976bf4b45965f6590c7619a008d34
- Ethereum block hash
- 0xa94976da5a227fddc26d2d90bc14299501c848de4118831a2c4f0a09462c81e4
How to interpret a change
A missing, late, invalid, or broken-chain statement is a signal to investigate. It is not, by itself, proof that a secret demand or compromise occurred.
Verify independently
Do not trust the visual badge alone. Verify the file and compare the fingerprint.
- 1
Download the plaintext statement and the public key.
- 2
Import the public key into a local GPG keyring.
- 3
Verify the clear-signed statement with GPG.
- 4
Compare the reported fingerprint with the one shown here and in a second trusted channel.
gpg --verify canary.txtStatement archive
Previous statements remain available so the monthly hash chain can be audited.